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The banking sector plays a crucial role in the allocation of resources and any form of
distortion in its functioning is likely to have economy-wide effects. This has motivated a large
bodyofresearchmainlydevotedtotheanalysisofbankingindustryliberalization, privatization
and regulation. Surprisingly, although ﬁscal issues are likely to exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on banks’ behaviour, the taxation of the ﬁnancial sector has received little attention (Caminal,
2003).
The macroeconomic consequences of the taxation of the banking sector are analyzed in
thetheoriesofﬁscalrepression, thatstressthelinkbetweentheefﬁciencyofthe ﬁnancialsector
and the process of capital accumulation (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). From a more
microeconomic point of view, the standard optimal taxation theory suggests that intermediate
goods and services should not be taxed (the connected distortions to the production process
make taxing these markets more costly than taxing the ﬁnal outputs). Given that banks operate
both with ﬁrms and retails consumers, the loss of efﬁciency connected with the distortion
engendered by the taxation of banks depends on who is actually bearing the ﬁscal burden. For
these reasons, it is important to assess both if banks actually bear the burden of taxes formally
levied on their activities and, should this not be the case, onto which category of clients they
can manage to transfer it.
This paper studies how corporate income tax (CIT) inﬂuences bank proﬁtability. The
theoretical part derives a set of predictions about the effects of CIT on banks’ income
statements taking into account that such taxation affects the investment policy of the entire
corporate sector and, consequently, also the demand schedules for banking services. This
mechanism, which we label the “market effect” of CIT, has been neglected by the literature
which focuses mainly on the distortions on the capital structure posed by CIT which, in fact,
c a nb es e e na sat a xo ne q u i t y .A l t h o u g hs u c h“ c o s tof equity effect” is admittedly particularly
important for banks (capital requirements limit their opportunities to substitute equity with
1 We would like to thank Marcello Bofondi, Ramon Caminal, Harry Huizinga, Stefania Zotteri and
one anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also thank the participants at the Bank of Italy Regional
Economics seminar and at the 2006 CEF conference held in Cyprus. The usual disclaimer applies. The
opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not involve the Bank of Italy.
Email addresses: ugo.albertazzi@bancaditalia.it; leonardo.gambacorta@bancaditalia.it.4
other forms of ﬁnancing), it will be shown that by neglecting the market effect one cannot
explain the empirical evidence.
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The econometric part of this paper studies the link between bank proﬁtability and
taxation by using data for ten industrialized countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States) over the period
1981-2003. The dataset includes annual ﬁgures from the balance sheet and the income
statement of the aggregated national banking industries, collected byO E C Di nah a r m o n i z e d
way that minimizes the effects of differences in accounting and statistical deﬁnitions and
allows meaningful comparisons across cou n t r i e s . A sam e a s u r eo ft a x a t i o nw eu s et h e
corporate income tax rate that can be reasonably considered exogenous for two reasons: it
is not affected by banks’ choices, as the effectivet a xr a t ew o u l db e( t h ee x - p o s tt a xr a t e ) ;i ti s
not industry-speciﬁc, so that it is unlikely to be determined by policy makers just because of
its effects on the banking sector.
One of the main novelties of the paper lies in the comprehensive analysis of the effect
of CIT on all income statement components and on banks’ prices. In particular, the analysis
of the impact of the CIT on the interest rate for loans and on deposits helps us to assess the
presence of tax shifting for different customers separately. In other words, wetrytounderstand
not only if the net interest margin (the difference between interest received from borrowers and
that paid to depositors) is affected by the level of the corporate income tax levied on banks’
proﬁts, but also if the potential tax shifting is against borrowers or depositors.
The empirical ﬁndings are coherent with the predictions of the theoretical model and can
be summarized in the following points. First, the evidence is consistent with the existence of
two types of mechanisms through which the CIT inﬂuences banks’ behaviour. On one hand,
a higher CIT rate raises the costs of bank equity making capital requirements tighter. On the
other hand, a higher CIT rate brings a reduction of investments from the incorporated sector
and a downward shift of the demand for bank loans and other bank services. Second, the CIT
2 Although the ﬁnancial sector is subject to general corporate income taxation, it is worth mentioning that
with regard to other forms of taxes it often receives special treatments like, for instance, VAT exemption. Banks
are also subject to implicit subsidization or taxation (below-cost deposit insurance, bailouts in cases of ﬁnancial
collapse, reserve requirements and capital requirements). They also serve as tax collecting subsidiaries of their
clients (withholding taxes on the capital income). For a complete analysis of the taxation of ﬁnancial ﬁrms see
De Bonis, Monacelli and Pazienza (2005).5
rate inﬂuences the interest rate demanded on loans with no signiﬁcant impact on the interest
rate paid on deposits, in line with the so called separability hypothesis. Third, banks are able
to shift a large part, approximately 90 per cent, of the CIT burden.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple
theoretical model on the effect of the corporate income tax on bank proﬁtability. Section 3
describes the dataset and brieﬂy discusses how bank proﬁtability and taxation evolved in the
periodunder investigation. Section4presents the econometric model andthe empirical results.
The last section summarizes the main conclusions.
2. A theoretical model
This section presents an adapted version of the basic Monti-Klein model which allows
one to study the effects of corporate income taxation on banks’ behavior and proﬁtability.
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The demand for loan is described byt h ei n v e r s ed e m a n df u n c t i o nl = l(L,τ). It
provides the interest rate borrowers are willing to pay for a given amount of loans L and a
given CIT rate τ.
The partial derivatives of l(L,τ) are both assumed to be negative: l0
L (L,τ) < 0 and
l0
τ (L,τ) < 0. These two conditions simply derive from the fact that for higher interest rates
on loans or for higher corporate income tax rates fewer investment projects have positive net
present values. In particular, following an increase in τ,t h el e v e lo fl at which the demand of
loans L remains unchanged is lower.
Similarly, the inverse demand function for fee-generating services is given by f =
f (S,τ) with f0
S (S,τ) < 0 and f0
τ (S,τ) < 0,w h e r eS is the quantity and f are the fees. The
assumption f0
τ (S,τ) < 0 reﬂects the fact that part of these services are related to ﬁrm
production activities.
The supply of deposits by households is given by the increasing function d = d(D),
denoting the interest rate required by deposito r si no r d e rt os u p p l ya na m o u n to fd e p o s i t se q u a l
to D.
3 Detailed comments on the standard Monti-Klein model are in Freixas and Rochet (2007).6
The economy is populated by N identical banks characterized by a cost function which,
for simplicity, is assumed to be linear and separable:
Cj = γDDj + γLLj + γSSj (1)
where Dj, Lj and Sj are the quantities of deposits, loans and services for bank j,w i t h
j =1 ,...,Nand γD, γL and γS are all positive parameters.
4
Provisions are assumed to be a constant fraction π of loans. Banks can borrow (or lend)
on the interbank market at a given money market rate r.D e n o t i n g Mj their net interbank
liabilities, the proﬁt function for bank j is therefore given by:
Pj = lLj − dDj − rMj + fSj − πLj − Cj (2)
To consider the effect of τ on the cost of bank capital two additional factors need to
be considered. One is the presence of prudential capital requirements which, for simplicity,
are assumed to be always binding. This assumption, quite common in the literature (see
for instance Bolton and Freixas, 2006), requires the amount of equity to be a given fraction
0 < ρ < 1 of loans:
Ej = ρLj (3)
Second, in the spirit of Caminal (2003) we introduce a ﬁscal effect of the corporate
income tax on the cost of equity. It is therefore assumed that the decision maker is a “bank
licence holder” with no private wealth who needs to raise equity on the market.
Denoting v the value of the licence, η the net rate of return required by outside investors
and φj the proportion of the bank owned by them, then φj is determined by the following no
arbitrage condition:
4 Separability refers to the marginal costs only. This form of separability does not exclude other forms of
economies of scope. For example, there could be economies of scope in ﬁxed costs (setting the branch network).
However, since ﬁxed costs play no role in the analysis they are totally ignored.7
φjPj (1 − τ)
Ej − v
− 1=η (4)
The numerator of the fraction on the left hand side is the amount of net proﬁts accruing
to outside investors, the denominator is their disbursement. The term on the left hand side
corresponds to the net rate of return obtainedb yo u t s i d ei n v e s t o r sw h i c hi sa s s u m e dt ob e
equal to η, their alternative option.
The bank licence holder decides a level for Ej, Lj, Dj, Sj and Mj by maximizing his
proﬁts:





The balance-sheet constraint is given by:
Lj = Dj + Ej + Mj (6)
Taking into account equations 1-6, the maximization problem can be written as:
max
Lj,Dj,Sj
(1 − τ)[Lj (l(Lj + L−j,τ) − e γ) − Dj (d(Dj + D−j)+γD − r)+






h=1,h6=j Lh, D−j =
PN
h=1,h6=j Dh, S−j =
PN
h=1,h6=j Sh and e γL = γL + π +
ρ
1+η
1−τ +( 1− ρ)r.
Some interesting remarks can already be made. First, the addend
1+η
1−τv is constant and
can be neglected from the analysis so that v does not play any role (it just affects the parameter
φj determining how proﬁts are divided between the licence holder and outside investors).
Second, the unique impact of provisions and, more importantly, of capital requirements
is on the marginal cost of loans. Indeed, the positive quantity e γ can be seen as an8
adjusted marginal cost: beyond operational expenses, loans imply additional costs in terms
of provisions (π), in terms of capital requirements ρ
1+η
1−τ and, for the part that does not need to
be ﬁnanced by equity, in terms of interest rate to be paid on the money market (1 − ρ)r.
Third, the additive form of equation 1 and the presence of the interbank market implies
full separability so that the three quantities (Lj,D j,S j) are chosen independently from each
other. An important consequence of separability is that τ has no inﬂuence on the market for
deposits: the unique channels through which τ operates are the marginal cost of outside equity
1+η
1−τ and the demand for loans l(L,τ). It is therefore already possible to state that changes in
τ will have no effect on the equilibrium interest rate paid on deposits nor on their quantity.
It remains therefore to understand the effect of τ on both the market for loans and that for
fee-generating services.
As in standard models of competition àl aCournot, from the ﬁrst order conditions and
t h o s eo fs y m m e t r yi ti sp o s s i b l et os h o w that the equilibrium quantities L∗ and S∗ in these two











where εL (L∗,τ) and εS (S∗,τ) are two positive quantities denoting the coefﬁcients of
elasticity of the (direct) demand functions of loans and fee-generating services respectively.
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As usual, both l (L ∗, τ) and f (S∗,τ) are decreasing functions of N and for N →∞
they converge to the adjusted marginal costs e γL and γS. Moreover, by applying the implicit
function theorem to conditions 8, it can be seen that N h a sap o s i t i v ee f f e c to ne q u i l i b r i u m
quantities L∗ and S∗, a standard result in models of competition àl aCournot.
In order to understand how τ affects the equilibrium in these two markets it is useful
to start by computing its effect on quantities. A restriction which extremely simpliﬁes the
notation with no signiﬁcant changes on the qualitative res u l t si st h a to fc o n s t a n tc o e f ﬁcients of
elasticity, εL (L,τ)=εL and εS (S,τ)=εS.
6 With this assumption, by applying the implicit
5 In symbols: εL (L,τ)=−(dL/diL)(iL/L) and εS (S,τ)=−(dS/df)(f/S). Other implicit and
standard assumptions are that second order conditions are satisifed and that all elasticities are greater than zero.
6 This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis by removing the effects that marginal changes in the elasticity9






















The ﬁrst equality in expression 9 reveals that dL∗
dτ < 0. There are two factors at work
both pushing in the same direction. The ﬁrst addend is a negative quantity and corresponds
to what has been deﬁned as the market effect: an increase in τ provokes a downward shift in
the demand curve (l0
τ < 0) always bringing a decrease in the equilibrium quantity. The second
o n ei sa l s on e g a t i v ea n dc a nb ed e ﬁned as the cost effect: an increase of τ,b yi n c r e a s i n gt h e
adjusted marginal cost e γ, leads to a higher price l and a smaller quantity L.
Similar comments can be made on the expression for dS∗
dτ , which is therefore also
negative, although in this case the cost effect is absent (γS does not depend on τ since fee-
generating services are not subje c tt oc a p i t a lr e q u i r e m e n t s ) .












From conditions 9 and 10 one can obtain:
dl(L∗,τ)










Given the assumption of a constant coefﬁcient of elasticity, τ has an impact on l only
through the cost effect and its sign is positive (e γ
0
τ > 0): an increase in τ implies an increase
in the equilibrium interest rate, as intuition would suggest. On the contrary, since capital
requirements do not affect fee generating services, there is no cost effect and τ does not
inﬂuence the equilibrium price.
would imply on the pricing of non-competitive banks and which might work in any direction.10
For the purpose of this paper it is crucial to analyze the link between the CIT rate and
bank proﬁt components, in other words as τ inﬂuences banks’ revenues lL∗ and fS∗.T h i s
is particularly important for the empirical analysis of the effects of corporate income taxation
on the market for fee-generating services since for this segment, which includes several types
of non directly comparable services, there are no separate measures of prices and quantities.




dτ L∗ + dL∗
dτ l(L∗,τ)
d
dτf (S∗,τ)S∗ = dS∗
dτ f (S∗,τ)
(12)
The total effect of τ on banks’ net interest margin depends on the effect it exerts on prices
and quantities which, as shown above, are respectively positive and negative (
dl(L∗,τ)
dτ > 0 and
dL∗
dτ < 0). Under some mild regularity conditions it will be true that d
dτl(L∗,τ)L∗ > 0 for a
sufﬁciently low τ (L∗ is large and l is small, so that the sign of l0
L prevails) while the opposite
is true for a sufﬁciently largeτ.
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As already pointed out, the absence of a cost effect and the assumption of constant
coefﬁcients of elasticity make the equilibrium f invariant with respect to τ. Therefore, fee-
income f (S∗,τ)S∗ depends on the CIT rate only through S∗ which is a decreasing function
of τ. It follows that d
dτf (S∗,τ)S∗ < 0.
The main predictions of the model are therefore the following. First, the effect of an
increase of CIT rate on the net interest margin can be of either sign. In particular, given the
presence of a bank capital cost effect and of a market effect, a marginal increase in τ implies an
increase (reduction) in the net interest margin if τ is sufﬁciently low (high). Second, the effect
of τ on bank revenues from fee generating services, not concerned by capital requirements, is
always negative. Third, as a joint consequence of the assumptions of an additive cost function
and of an interbank market with an exogenous interest rate, an increase in the CIT rate should
be reﬂe c t e di na ni n c r e a s eo ft h ei n t e r e s tr a t ed e m a n d e do nl o a n sw i t hn os i g n i ﬁcant impact
on the interest rate paid on deposits. Finally, the corporate income taxation can be expected
to inﬂuence both operating costs and provisions through the negative effect it exerts on the
amount of loans and on the quantity of fee-generating services.
7 The regularity conditions just require that as τ → 1 (τ → 0) the quantity demanded gets arbitrarily small
(large).11
3. Some facts on bank proﬁtability and taxation
In the last twenty years, changes in regulation, demand composition and technology
have modiﬁed the structure and the boundaries of credit markets.
8 All these changes have
strengthened competition, especially in traditional lending activity, reduced intermediation
margins and encouraged banks to diversify their sources of revenue and increase efﬁciency in
production and distribution. The introduction of the euro has eliminated most of the residual
barriers to competition among the banking systems of the countries that have adopted the
common currency.
9
The aim of this section is to investigate if, given the type of relationships suggested by
the theoretical model presented above, the changes we have observed in the banking industry
could at least partly be explained also by changes in corporate income taxation. Establishing
such a relationship is important not only to interpret the dramatic changes that have occurred
in the banking systems of industrialized economies but also to understand why we still observe
substantial segmentation of the European national banking sectors (ECB, 2005). In fact,
although European directives and regulations impose minimum standards, the overall ﬁscal
treatment of banks and other corporations remains the purview of national authorities, and
residual differences may constitute a barrier to full integration (Huizinga, 2004).
T a b l e s1a n d2s h o wt h em a i nm a croeconomic and bank proﬁtability indicators dividing
the sample in two sub-periods: 1981-1992 and 1993-2003. This sample split, based on the
date of the Maastricht Treaty, should take into account the effects of the convergence process
towards the adoption of the single currency. Strong differences in the two periods emerge not
only in real and ﬁnancial indicators but also in the CIT rate.
Since the beginning of the 1990s cross-country variability of gross income as a share
of total assets has decreased in the euro area (Figure 1). This fact reﬂects the progressive
convergence of corporate income taxation among main Euro area countries (Figure 2). When
one includes the Anglo-Saxon banking systems the picture becomes less clear-cut: the
8 We can think, for example, of the abolition of geographical constraints to banking activity in the US after
the introduction of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efﬁciency Act in 1994 (Berger, Kashyap
and Scalise, 1995) or, in Italy, of the liberalization of branch networks in 1990 (Ciocca, 2000). For an analysis of
credit market deregulation see Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998).
9 Berger, DeYoung and Udell (2000) stress the fact that linguistic, cultural, regulation differences and long
distance coordination problems may still counterbalance the beneﬁt of cross-country consolidation activity.12
dispersion in bank proﬁtability turns out to be increasing while that of corporate income
taxation is decreasing. However, the reduction of the dispersion in the CIT rate appears less
pronounced than when we consider only euro area member states. This is coherent with the
notion that even the differences observed in bank proﬁtability between the euro area and the
Anglo-Saxon countries can be partly ascribed to different patterns of CIT.
Followingthereductionintheinﬂation rate, interestrateshavealsodeclinedmarkedly. It
is even more important to point out that the difference between the short-term lending rate and
the deposit rate (the spread) also declined. It is commonly argued that its reduction reﬂects the
process of deregulation of the banking sector that came with ﬁnancial stabilization. According
to the theoretical analysis above, the CIT rate should display a positive correlation with the
interest rate spread (the CIT rate exerts a positive effect on the interest rate and no effect on
that on deposits). Again, this suggests that at least part of the decline shown by the spread
could be explained by the reduction of corporate income taxation.
As shown in Table 2 and Figure 3 there has been a shift from net interest income to other
income not dependent on traditional ﬁnancial intermediation. The decline in interest margins
has changed the traditional role of banks and has forced them to search for new sources of
revenue such as trading, services and other ﬁnancial operations. Diversiﬁcation has been
s u s t a i n e db yt h ei n c r e a s e dp r o p e n s i t yo fh o u s e h o l d st oi n v e s ti nﬁnancial assets other than
government bonds, and by the greater opportunities for ﬁrms to access the capital markets.
Structural changes such as industry deregulation, new information technologies and ﬁnancial
innovation are recognized to have increased the importance of fee income. DeYoung and
Rice (2004) stress the fact that fee-based activities like trust services, mutual fund sales and
cash management require l i t t l eo rn or e g u l a t o r yc a p i t a l . H o w e v e r ,e v e nw i t hr e g a r dt ot h i s
trend towards diversiﬁcation, changes in the ﬁscal regime may have played a role. Indeed,
the theoretical model suggests that a decline in corporate income taxation may be associated,
somewhat counter-intuitively, with both a reduction of net interest income, at least for not too
high levels of CIT, and a rise of non-interest income.
In summary, the descriptive statistics suggest that the changes observed in corporate
income taxation and the effects they are predicted to exert on bank proﬁtability according
to the theoretical model could provide a plausible, although partial, interpretation of the
main developments in the proﬁt and loss accounts of credit intermediaries in industrialized13
countries. In the next section we provide an econometric framework allowing us to test
the main predictions of the theoretical model and, therefore, to check the robustness of this
interpretation.
4. The empirical evidence
4.1 The econometric model















+ θtTt + ηj + εj,t (13)
where index j denotes countries, t represents years, Yj,t is the income statement component
examined, Xj,t is a vector of control variables, Tt is a vector of year-dummies, ηj is an
unobservable time-invariant country effect and εj,t is a well behaved error term. In particular,
Xj,t =[ GDPj,t,DCPI j,t,MMR j,t,LTR j,t,SMC j,t,BL j,t,SMV j,t,TA j,t] where GDPj,t is
the level of real gross domestic product of country j in year t, DCPIj,t i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation,
MMRj,t is the money market rate, LTRj,t is the long-term government bond interest rate,
SMCj,t is the stock market capitalization divided by GDP, BLj,t is the total amount of bank
lending divided by GDP, SMVj,t is the stock market volatility, TA j,t is the total assets of the
entire banking sector. All variables are taken in logs except interest rates and ratios.
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The emphasis of the analysis is on the term γ1τj,t +γ2τ2
j,t which is the impact on Yj,t of
the corporate income tax rate (τj,t) .T h ed a t au s e da r es t a t u t o r y tax rates which include both
national corporate income tax and (an average of) local taxes. Such a component includes
a quadratic term in order to capture non linear effects postulated by the theoretical model in
Section 2.
T h em o d e lh a sb e e ne s t i m a t e du s i n gt h eG M Me s t i m a t o rs u g g e s t e db yA r e l l a n oa n d
Bond (1991), which ensures efﬁciency and consistency provided that the residuals do not show
serial correlation of order two and that the instruments used are valid (which is tested with the
Sargan test). Table 3 shows the results for equation 16 whereYj,t is in turn, net interest income,
10 See the Appendix for other details on the dataset. Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2006) provide other ref-
erences and more detailed comments on the econometric model and on the interpretation of the results for the
control variables.14
other income, operating costs, provisions, and proﬁt before tax. While lagged values of the
dependent variable are signiﬁcant, lags of the independent variables turned out to be almost
always not signiﬁcant and were not reported in the table (if not stated differently). In all
regressions, diagnostic tests resulted to be well behaved.
4.2 Net interest income
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 reports the results for net interest income.
Proﬁts obtained by banks through their traditional lending activity are correlated to
business cycle indicators like GDP and long term interest rates. Moreover, they are higher in
those countries where both the ﬁnancial markets and the banking sector are more developed.
A ss h o w ni nt h ee s t i m a tion results, both γ0s turn out to be signiﬁcant; the coefﬁcient for
the linear term with a positive sign, while the one for the quadratic term with a negative sign.
In Figure 4a, we use the coefﬁcients of Table 3 to plot the estimated marginal effect of τ on




γ2τ). Consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model, this
expression is decreasing, signiﬁcantly greater than zero for small levels of τ and signiﬁcantly
less than zero for large levels of τ. In particular, it should be pointed out that the presence
of a cost of equity effect (the CIT rate alters the cost of bank external equity) is a necessary
condition for having a positive impact of the CIT rate on bank proﬁts. At the same time,
considering the cost of equity effect alone, by neglecting the market effect, would not generate
an interval of τ in which its marginal impact on the net interest income is negative.
4.3 Non-interest income
The second column of Table 3 shows the results for non-interest income. Only one lag
of the dependent variable is signiﬁcant.
Non-interest income is not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by real GDP ﬂuctuations, in line
with the intuitive idea that these services provide an effective tool to stabilize banks proﬁts.
Non-interest income shows a negative correlation with long-term interest rates, which may be
connected with the losses of value of ﬁxed rate securities in banks’ portfolios. Finally, it is
positively affected by the stock market size and volatility. The ﬁrst effect is in line with the
idea that the possibility to provide a variety of banking services together is higher when local
ﬁnancial markets are more developed. The effect of volatility is likely to be connected to the15
fact that these services are needed more needed when uncertainty is higher (portfolios are more
often readjusted and ﬁrms buy more derivatives for hedging purposes).
With regard to the effect of CIT, it can be seen that both the coefﬁcients associated with
τ and its square are signiﬁcant. As shown in Figure 4b and as predicted by the theoretical
model, the marginal effect of τ is negative although not signiﬁcantly different from zero for
large levels of τ. The interpretation is the following: given that capital requirements do not
involve fee-generating activities, the unique way in which CIT has an impact on non-interest
income is through a shift in the demand of such services which always leads to a reduction in
revenues (if the demand shifts downward, both the quantity and the price decrease). Therefore,
a necessary condition for the existence of a negative effect of τ on non-interest income is the
presence of a demand effect.
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4.4 Operating expenses
The fourth column of Table 3 reports the results for operating costs. Two lags of the
dependent variable are included.
As intuition would suggest, operating expenses show a low correlation with the business
cycle. They are instead inﬂuenced by inﬂa t i o n( p r o b a b l yi nc o n n e c t i o nw i t hs o m el e v e lo f
wage indexation) and by the level of development of local ﬁnancial markets (consistent with
the idea that the more sophisticated the services, the higher the personnel costs).
Here only the linear term for τ turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant and with a negative
coefﬁcient. This is as predicted by the theoretical model, given that operating costs are a
function of quantities and given that both L∗ and S∗ are a (monotonic) decreasing function of
τ.
4.5 Provisions
The fourth section of Table 3 displays the results for provisions. Credit losses and
readjustment values are negatively correlatedw i t hr e a lg r o s sd o m e s t ic product and long-term
interest rates, while they increase with short-term interest rate and stock market volatility.
11 T h ef a c tt h a tt h ec o e f ﬁcient for the quadratic term is signiﬁcant and such that it implies that for τ large the
marginal effect is not different from zero, is also consistent with the theoretical model. Consider, for example,
the family of demand functions given by: S = h(1 − τ)
n /fm with h, n and m positive quantities. These
demand functions have a constant coefﬁcient of elasticity and satisfy both d
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Mainoni (2003): when real economic conditions improve, banks expect lower future credit
losses and diminish provisions accordingly. The negative impact of the long-term interest rate
is related to the fact that such a variable tends to rise in periods of good economic conditions,
whicharecharacterizedbyasmallerprobabilityofdefault. Provisionsincreasewiththemoney
market rate, consistently with the “ﬁnancial instability hypothesis” (Fisher, 1933; Minsky,
1975 and Kindleberger 1978): high short-term interest rates increase the burden for borrowers
and their default probability.
With regard to taxation, given the link between the CIT rate and the amount of loans, the
predicted sign of the estimated coefﬁcient is negative. The results show indeed a negative γ1,
although not signiﬁcant. The relatively low predictive power of this equation is likely to be
connected with two factors. First, provisions are a rather subjective and arbitrary component
of bank proﬁts and may be inﬂuenced by “window dressing” accounting policies. Second, the
simpliﬁed framework used in the theoretical model does not take into account that the average
riskiness of the loan portfolio is in general not independent on their quantity.
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4.6 Proﬁtb e f o r et a x e s
The ﬁnal column of Table 3 presents the results for proﬁt before taxes.
Given that these are deﬁned as gross income (the sum of net interest income and
non-interest income) net of operating expenses and provisions, this regression represents a
summary of the previous four.
Contrary to what happens when we consider the different components separately, the
square of the CIT rate is not statistically signiﬁcant, showing that the opposite signs of the two
relevant coefﬁcients in the regressions for the net interest income and the non interest income
cancel each other out. The overall effect of an increase in the CIT rate is an increase in proﬁt
before taxes which shows that banks can shift at least part of the CIT. This is coherent with
ﬁndings of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001).
12 This link could derive from many sources. For example, one might think that as the amount of loans
s h r i n k st h ed e g r e eo fd i v e r s i ﬁc a t i o nw o u l da l s od e c r e a s e .17
4.7 Borrowers or depositors?
The results described above, in particular those concerning net interest income, suggest
the presence of tax shifting from the bank to its clients. Such tax shifting may occur in two
ways: through an increase of the interest rate on lending (l) or through a decrease in the interest
rate on deposits (d); it is therefore interesting to disentangle the effects on the spread (l−d)v i a
the mark-up (l −r,w h e r er represents the money market interest rate) and via the mark-down
(r − d) .M o r e o v e r ,t h i se x e r c i s ep r o v i d e sa ne m p i r ical test of the separability hypothesis.
We have therefore estimated the following models:
(l − r)j,t =
2 P
k=1





L,kΨj,t−k + γL,1τj,t + θL,tTt + ηL,j + εL,j,t
(r − d)j,t =
2 P
k=1





D,kΨj,t−k + γD,1τj,t + θD,tTt + ηD,j + εD,j,t
(14)
where, in dealing with a spread variable, we used as control regressors Ψj,t =
[∆GDPj,t,(TA/GDP)j,t,MMV j,t],i nw h i c hMMVj,t stands for money market volatility.
Only the linear term of the CIT rate has been considered (the quadratic term is never
signiﬁcant).
T a b l e4s h o w st h er e s u l t so ft h i se x e r c i s e . Consistent with the predictions of the
dealership model by Ho and Saunders (1981) and its extension by Angbazo (1997) the mark-
up and the mark-down are positively correlated with higher money market volatility. However,
only the effect on the mark-up is statistically signiﬁcant. The same occurs for the size of the
banking sector, measured by the ratio between total banking assets and GDP, that tends to
reduce mostly the mark-up. The positive effect of real GDP growth on the mark-down is
likely to reﬂect the increase of the deposit holdings by households in periods of expansion.
On the contrary the effect of an increase in real GDP on the lending interest rate, although
positive, is statistically not signiﬁcant, probably reﬂecting a concomitant increase in self-
ﬁnancing (Friedman and Kuttner, 1993).
Overall, these results reveal that a one per cent increase in the CIT rate increases the
spread by 7 basis points. The effect concerns borrowers almost exclusively. Again, these
ﬁndings are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model and in particular with18
those deriving from the assumption of separability: an increase in the CIT rate determines a
higher interest rate demanded on loans with no signiﬁcant impact on the interest rate paid on
deposits.
Asacheckonrobustnesswereestimatedanequationregressionsimilartothebenchmark
model (13) for both the interest received on loans (lL) and those paid on deposits (dD). Again
the effect of the CIT rate on net interest income comes via the interest rate on loans, leaving
all the other results unchanged.
4.8 Analysis of the tax burden
As shown in the ﬁfth column of Table 3, in the equation for proﬁt before taxes, the CIT
rate turns out to be signiﬁcant and with a positive sign. This suggests the possibility for banks
to shift part of the tax burden.
The speciﬁcation adopted does not permit a quantitative appraisal of the extent to which
banks are actually able to operate such tax shifting. An initial attempt consists of estimating a
regression similar to equation 13 for the proﬁt after taxes. The results of this exercise reveal
that the CIT rate τ has a negative but non signiﬁcant coefﬁcient (−0.312 with a standard error
of 1.158)
13. This means that an increase in taxation is likely to determine a drop in banks’
proﬁts after taxes which is not signiﬁcantly different from zero; in other words, this evidence
says that banks are able to shift a large part of their tax burden.
A more precise quantiﬁcation of the tax burden for banks may be obtained by computing
the impact on proﬁts of an additional unit of currency of taxes. Few calculations allow us to
derive these quantities from the estimated coefﬁcients of equation 13 for proﬁt before taxes
and proﬁta f t e rt a x e s .
14 The result of this exercise shows that, for example, if taxes are raised
by one euro, the reduction in banks’ proﬁt after taxes are on average equal to 3 cents, a value
that is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
13 Results are unchanged if we include the quadratic term for τ and we consider the derivative for any value
of τ, as we did in ﬁgure 4 for the net interest and the non-interest income.
14 Denoting T, PBT and PAT the amount of taxes, proﬁt before taxes and proﬁt after taxes respectively,
we have T = PBTτ which implies ∂T/∂τ = ∂ (τPBT)/∂τ = PBT + τ∂(PBT)/∂τ. This expression
can be used to get the following derivative ∂PAT/∂T =
βPAT(1−τ)
1+βPBT∗τ ,w h e r eβPAT = ∂ ln(PAT)/∂τ and
βPBT = ∂ ln(PBT)/∂τ.19
Given that the above calculations are based on an approximation,
15 as a robustness check
we have tried to corroborate the results by running a regression for banks’ proﬁts similar to
equation 13 but in which the tax rate has been substituted by the amount of taxes actually
paid.
16 It turned out that while in the regression for proﬁt after taxes the amount of taxes
is not signiﬁcant (-0.108 with a standard error of 0.137), in the case of proﬁt before taxes the
coefﬁcient isalmostequaltooneandhighlysigniﬁcant (0.945 with astandard errorof0.149).
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To sum up, banks display the ability to shift at least 90 per cent of their corporate income
taxburden, althoughthis is alsoinﬂuenced by the competitive pressure they face. Thishappens
mainly through an increase of net interest income, although this is not true at high rates of CIT,
and through a reduction in operating costs and provisions. Finally, coherent with predictions
of the theoretical model tax shifting on net interest income takes place through a rise in the
interest rate on loans. No signiﬁcant effect on the interest rate on deposits is detected.
4.9 Differences across periods and groups of countries
In section 2 it has been stated that important structural changes concerning both the real
economy and the banking sector occurred from the ﬁrst part of the sample (1981-1992) to
the second one (1993-2003). For this reason it is natural to investigate whether the results
presented above hold indifferently across sub-periods. In order to do so we estimated the
benchmark model for all income components by allowing the effect of τj,t and τ2
j,t to differ








where dt i sad u m m yt h a tt a k e st h ev a l u eo f1 in the
period 1993-2003 and 0 elsewhere. It turned out that both coefﬁcients γ∗
1 and γ∗
2 were not
signiﬁcant at conventional levels in all the equations.
As a second test, we estimated the model by allowing the effect of τj,t and τ2
j,t to
differ between the euro area and Anglo-Saxon countries. In this case we have estimated the
benchmark model for all income components by adding in equation (13) the following term
15 The starting equality T = PBTτ is valid for the effective (ex-post) CIT rate, while the one we use in the
regressions, for reasons related to possible problems of endogeneity, is the ex-ante one.
16 Moreover, all variables previously taken in logarithm are left in levels, so that the coefﬁcient for taxes can
be interpreted as the impact on proﬁts of an additional unit of currency.
17 This test is also useful in order to corroborate the ﬁndings with respect to another issue emphasized in the
literature. In fact, Huizinga and Laeven (2007) show that multinational ﬁrms engage in substantial international
proﬁt shifting activities. This may render the statutory tax rate not a perfect measure of the taxation actually










t is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the case of the United
States and the United Kingdom. Even in this case both coefﬁcients γ∗
1 and γ∗
2 were never
signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
5. Conclusions
In this study we have investigated, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective,
how bank proﬁtability is affected by corporate income taxation.
The main innovation of the theoretical model is to consider that the link between bank
proﬁts and corporate income taxation is determinedby two factors. One is denoted the “market
effect” of the CIT: an increase in the CIT rate modiﬁes the demand for bank services and bank
price setting should take these demand shifts into account. The second factor is the “cost of
equity effect”, due to the presence of capital requirements that render the CIT rate equivalent
to a tax on equity.
The empirical ﬁndings, obtained using data for the main industrialized countries over
the period 1980-2003, are consistent with the predictions of the model and with the presence
of these two effects. Moreover, in line with the separability hypothesis between loan and
deposit markets, changes in the CIT rate have an impact only on the interest rate demanded
on loans with no signiﬁc a n ti m p a c to nt h a tp a i do nd e p o s i t s . T h i sﬁnding provides some
empirical ground for theories of ﬁscal repression, stating that any form of taxation eventually
bornbyborrowersmaydetermineaﬁnancialdisintermediationandanoveralllossofefﬁciency
connected with higher agency costs (Caminal, 2003). The presence of separability may also
explain why ceilings on deposit interest rates, popular during the 1980s, did not succeed in
keeping low rates on loans (Freixas and Rochet, 2007).
Finally, the results show that banks have the ability to shift at least 90 per cent of their
corporate income tax burden. No signiﬁcant differences in the link between bank proﬁtability
and taxation emerge when comparing the eighties with the nineties or euro area and Anglo-
Saxon countries.Appendix: technical details on the data
The dataset includes ﬁgures for 10 countries over the period 1981-2003. We have
analyzed 8 euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, Austria,
Portugal and Belgium), the United States and the United Kingdom. Data on income statements
(net interest income, non-interest income, operating costs, provisions, and proﬁt before taxes)
and total assets are taken from OECD Bank Proﬁtability.
Total lending and interest rates have been obtained by national harmonized statistics for
countries belonging to the euro area and from IMF Financial Statistics for United Kingdom
and United States. Data on total lending for euro area countries were not always available
for the entire time period. For those years we have reconstructed them backwards using IMF
growth rate statistics.
From IMF Financial Statistics we also obtained a set of macroeconomic indicators:
consumer price index, gross domestic product, the interest rate paid on long-term government
bonds and the money market interest rate.
Data on national stock market capitalization and volatility were collected from Thomson
Financial Datastream. From the Institute for Fiscal Studies we obtained information on
statutory tax rates which include both national corporate income tax and local taxes (their
average across regions), where they exist. In the case of Netherlands, where corporate income
tax is progressive, we have used the maximum marginal rate.References
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Austria 14.70    0.53    2.45    3.56    86.24    3.36    13.60    7.12    0.10    9.93    3.78    6.15   
Belgium 13.49    0.43    1.96    4.29    67.80    13.01    13.94    8.35    0.12    12.70    6.20    6.51   
France 14.44    0.44    2.17    5.79    82.89    8.73    16.11    10.53    0.07    11.09    5.81    5.28   
Germany 15.10    0.62    2.43    2.94    98.63    10.99    14.65    6.76    0.08    10.88    5.80    5.09   
Italy 8.83    0.45    2.07    9.21    57.87    10.13    19.59    14.85    0.06    16.59    9.61    6.98   
Netherlands  14.42    0.41    2.24    2.59    88.65    28.05    13.58    7.12    0.09    10.35    4.02    6.33   
Portugal  3.34    0.48    2.67    16.09    59.69    9.09    12.72    15.05    0.12    22.55    18.38    4.17   
Spain 5.75    0.35    2.75    8.79    70.67    18.94    15.30    14.24    0.11    14.73    10.58    4.15   
Euro area 11.26    0.46    2.34    6.66    76.55    12.79    14.94    10.50    0.09    13.60    8.02    5.58   
United Kingdom 7.46    0.40    2.14    6.29    87.78    49.99    15.53    11.35    0.12    11.45    10.17    1.28   
United States 18.76    0.44    2.89    4.56    43.57    33.12    17.25    8.64    0.09    10.67    8.63    2.04   
Austria  24.06    0.34    1.87    1.93    100.78    13.17    11.14    3.97    0.08    6.91    2.47    4.45   
Belgium 22.25    0.40    1.98    1.85    83.25    48.75    11.32    4.21    0.09    8.01    3.62    4.40   
France 22.42    0.37    1.82    1.59    82.10    54.48    18.39    4.40    0.10    6.94    3.45    3.49   
Germany 23.44    0.51    1.17    1.88    124.01    36.09    17.46    3.91    0.09    10.10    3.38    6.72   
Italy 18.56    0.46    1.45    3.12    75.07    34.38    21.94    6.10    0.10    8.77    3.88    4.88   
Netherlands 22.90    0.35    2.34    2.62    122.63    117.90    16.76    3.90    0.09    5.88    3.27    2.60   
Portugal 10.10    0.37    2.08    3.73    96.08    38.57    13.75    6.12    0.10    9.20    5.15    4.05   
Spain 13.44    0.35    2.77    3.40    88.22    42.32    18.67    5.76    0.11    6.74    4.49    2.25   
Euro area 19.65    0.39    1.94    2.51    96.52    48.21    16.18    4.80    0.09    7.82    3.71    4.10   
United Kingdom 14.74    0.31    2.77    2.31    126.23    130.29    16.65    5.39    0.10    5.63    2.98    2.65   
United States 31.38    0.39    3.14    2.49    43.58    96.53    19.55    4.28    0.09    7.27    4.41    2.86   
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from International Financial Statistics.
Note: (1) Thousands euros for all countries except United States (thousands Dollars) and United Kingdom (thousands Pounds Sterling). - (2) Data for Portugal refers to 1990-1992; those for Spain to 1987-1992. 
(1993-2003)
(1981-1992)
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ROE     
(1)
Austria  1.62    0.64    0.28          2.26    1.46    0.52    0.28    0.16    0.12    0.57    6.99   
Belgium (2) 1.64    0.41    0.20          2.05    1.41    0.34    0.30    0.12    0.18    0.39    5.96   
France 2.09    0.50    0.19          2.59    1.88    0.30    0.41    0.14    0.28    0.33    8.13   
Germany 2.26    0.59    0.21          2.85    1.79    0.43    0.63    0.39    0.24    0.62    6.30   
Italy 3.45    1.05    0.23          4.50    2.79    0.76    0.95    0.44    0.51    0.47    9.72   
Netherlands 2.19    0.77    0.26          2.97    1.95    0.41    0.61    0.10    0.51    0.16    10.74   
Portugal 3.28    1.02    0.24          4.29    2.32    1.20    0.77    0.14    0.47    0.22    7.18   
Spain 4.08    0.82    0.17          4.90    3.12    0.77    1.01    0.24    0.77    0.24    8.39   
Euro area 2.58    0.73    0.22          3.30    2.09    0.59    0.62    0.22    0.41    0.35    7.93   
United Kingdom (3) 3.05    1.85    0.38          4.89    3.20    0.97    0.72    0.32    0.40    0.45    8.91   
United States 3.42    1.45    0.30          4.87    3.28    0.74    0.84    0.24    0.60    0.29    9.27   
Austria  1.48    1.10    0.43          2.59    1.75    0.39    0.45    0.06    0.38    0.15    7.65   
Belgium 1.12    0.68    0.38          1.80    1.18    0.17    0.45    0.12    0.33    0.26    10.81   
France 0.98    1.08    0.53          2.05    1.37    0.33    0.36    0.10    0.26    0.27    5.71   
Germany 1.66    0.62    0.27          2.29    1.48    0.42    0.39    0.20    0.19    0.51    4.71   
Italy 2.56    1.03    0.29          3.59    2.24    0.60    0.75    0.36    0.39    0.48    5.20   
Netherlands 1.71    1.08    0.39          2.78    1.91    0.20    0.68    0.19    0.49    0.28    11.52   
Portugal 2.17    0.91    0.30          3.08    1.83    0.46    0.80    0.14    0.66    0.17    6.11   
Spain 2.53    1.00    0.28          3.52    2.11    0.57    0.84    0.17    0.67    0.20    7.37   
Euro area 1.78    0.94    0.35          2.71    1.73    0.39    0.59    0.17    0.42    0.28    7.39   
United Kingdom 2.06    1.50    0.42          3.56    2.13    0.32    1.11    0.36    0.76    0.32    16.45   
United States 3.58    2.39    0.40          5.97    3.66    0.45    1.86    0.63    1.23    0.34    14.03   
Note: (1) Profit after tax as a percentage of capital and reserves. Data for Austria in the first sample period refer to 1989-92. - (2) 1982-1992. - (3) 1984-1992. 






Coeff. S. error Coeff. S. error Coeff. S. error Coeff. S. error Coeff. S. error
Endogenous var. jt-1 0.974      *** 0.072      0.532      *** 0.054      0.772      *** 0.101      0.268      *** 0.087      0.233      0.800     
Endogenous var. jt-2 -0.210      *** 0.073      -0.209      *** 0.069      0.164      ** 0.081      0.206      *** 0.078     
log of real GDP jt 0.552      *** 0.181      -0.228      0.390      0.022      0.175      -1.690      * 1.001      2.030      * 1.170     
Inflation ratejt 0.138      0.419      1.844      * 1.080      0.470      * 0.283      5.377      * 3.247      3.470      2.620     
Money market rate jt 0.382      0.388      0.607      0.977      -0.025      0.307      4.853      * 2.778      -7.850      *** 2.820     
Long term rate jt 1.061      ** 0.515      -1.954      * 1.025      0.438      0.441      -6.967      * 3.896      5.742      ** 2.680     
Log of total assets  jt 0.141      *** 0.048      0.009      0.095      0.141      ** 0.058      0.754      ** 0.297      -0.260      0.282     
Lending /GDP jt 0.087      * 0.045      0.071      0.132      0.149      *** 0.044      0.072      0.385      0.079      0.390     
Stock Mark. Cap. /GDP jt 0.093      *** 0.031      0.071      0.071      0.122      *** 0.029      -0.064      0.220      0.396      * 0.210     
Stock Mark. Volatility jt 0.020      0.111      0.655      ** 0.293      0.038      0.095      4.066      *** 0.932      -2.043      ** 0.945     
Corporate Income Tax Ratejt 2.388      *** 0.803      -4.900      *** 1.890      -0.128      * 0.069      -0.865      0.928      1.449      ** 0.588     
(Corporate Income Tax Ratejt)
2 -2.620      *** 0.842      4.522      ** 2.000     
Sargan test (2nd step; p-value)      0.18           0.18           0.02           0.22           0.78     
MA(1), MA(2) (p-value)      0.00           0.25           0.00           0.76           0.00           0.61           0.00           0.19           0.00           0.72     
No. of countries, no. of observations      10           184           10           194           10           187           10           164           10           178     
Notes: (1) The model is given by equation (1), which includes two lags in order to obtain white noise residuals. Dependent variables are in logarithm. The model has been estimated using the GMM
estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), which ensures efficiency and consistency provided that the residuals are not subject to serial correlation of order two and that the instruments used are
valid (which is tested for with the Sargan test). The sample goes from 1981 to 2003. *Significant at the 10% level. ** Idem, 5%. *** Idem, 1%. Lagged values of the independent variables turned out to be




(v) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Provisions Operating cost (2) Non-interest incomeTable 4 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE SPREAD 
(1) 
 
Coeff. S. error Coeff. S. error
Endogenous var. jt-1 0.350      *** 0.072      0.567      *** 0.073     
Endogenous var. jt-2 0.131      ** 0.063     
Real GDP growth rate jt 0.001      0.001      0.003      *** 0.001     
Total bank assets/GDP   jt -0.011      ** 0.005      -0.001      0.003     
Money market volatility jt 0.044      *** 0.016      0.014      0.016     
Corporate Income Tax rate jt 0.059      ** 0.027      0.009      0.021     
Sargan test (2nd step; p-value)      0.74           0.32     
MA(1), MA(2) (p-value)      0.00           0.71           0.00           0.41     
No. of countries, no. of observations      10           207           10           199     
Notes: (1) The model is given by equation (1), which includes two lags in order to obtain white noise residuals. The model has been 
estimated using the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), which ensures efficiency and consistency provided that the 
residuals are not subject to serial correlation of order two and that the instruments used are valid (which is tested for with the Sargan test). 
The sample goes from 1981 to 2003. *Significant at the 10% level. ** Idem, 5%. *** Idem, 1%. Lagged values of the independent variables 
turned out to be not significant and have been removed.
Mark-down= money market rate- 
interest rate on deposits
(ii) (i)
Mark-up= short term interest rate 
on loans - money market rateFigure 1 
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(1) Coefficients of variation (ratio of cross-country standard deviation to simple average) of 
the gross income-to-total asset ratio. Source: OECD, Bank Profitability.  Figure 2 
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Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies. Figure 3 
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Marginal effect of the statutory tax rate (1) 
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(1) Plots of the derivative of each income component with respect to τ , the corporate income tax bracket 
(γ1t+2γ2τ j,t). The coefficients γ1 and γ2 are those reported in Table 3. Dotted lines represent confidence 
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